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ABSTRACT
Thisstudy tests for effects of OSHAenforcement,using dataoninjuries
and OSHA inspections for 6,842 manufacturing plants between 1979 and 1985. We
use measures of general deterrence (expected inspections at plants like this
one) and specific deterrence (actual inspections at this plant). Both measures
of deterrence are found to affect accidents, with a 10% increase in inspections
with penalties predicted to reduce accidents by 2%. The existence of specific
deterrence effects, the importance of lagged effects, the asymmetrical effects
of probability and amountofpenalty on accidents, and the tendency of injury
rates to self-correct over a few years support a behavioral model of the firm's
response to enforcement rather than the traditional 'expected penalty' model of
deterrence theory.
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The field of regulatory analysis has virtually ignored enforcement policy.
despitethe critical link enforcement provides between regulatory rules and
economic outcomes. Enforce.aent provides incentives for regulated entities Co
complywithregulatory rules. Appropriately designed enforcement policy may
alsoprovide souse correctives for the inefficiencies inherent in rule-based
regulatory systems (Scholz, l984a). Existing modelsofenforcement have been
limitedto a simple deterrence model which we believe provides an insufficient
basis for understanding the response of firms to regulatory enforcement.
Recently,thestudy ofregulatory enforcement has beenaided considerably
bythe availability of detailed enforcement information from the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSRA). Unfortunately, the lack of panel data
on how individual firms respond over time to enforcement actions has been a
major impediment to this research. Theoretical models have been limited to
relatively simple notions of deterrence. Empirical estimations have been
limited to tests based on cross-sectional firm-level data (Smith. 1979;
McCaffrey, 1983) or annual data aggregated to national (Viscusi, 1979),
industrial categorization (Viscusi. l986a; Band and Thomas, 1985) or injury
category(Mendeloff, 1979). These studieshave found mixed results in terms of
overalleffectiveness of OSHA inspections, and each suffers from different
threats to the validity of their empirical findings (see Viscusi, 1986b, for a
review.)
This article reports our efforts to develop an alternative model of firm
responses to regulatory enforcement andtotest themodel onadataset that
incorporatesenforcement actions and accident experiences of individual firms2
over time. The model we use is based on the assumptions of the behavioral
theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963) about the limited ability of firms
to evaluate and respond to enforcement threats. The model is tested on a
unique database chat combines the accident experience of 6,842 manufacturing
plants between 1979 ad 1985 with the OSHA enforcement records for those firms.
I. THE MODEL:ACCIDENTS,SAFETY EXPENDITURES, AND ENFORCEMENT
Thenumberof accidents at a plant depends on a variety of factors.
These include the technology in use at the plant (manufacturers of lumber and
wood products averaged 11.1 lost workday incidents per 100 workers in 1979.
compared with 5.6 for manufacturing as a whole), and thesizeand quality of
the plant's workforce (more workers, less experienced workers, and more tired
workers are associated with more accidents). Other factors include the
expenditures made by the firm to increase safety, both through physical capital
(saferequipment) and human capital (more safety training for workers).
Finally (as their name suggests) accidents have a substantial random component,
which cannot be eliminated completely by anything the firmdoes.
The classical model allows the optimal level of safety expenditures by th€
firm to depend on the costs of the expenditure relative to the costs of the
accidents being prevented. Paralleling the theoryofdeterrence developed in
criminology (Becker, 1968), OSHA inspections provide a further incentive for
safety expenditures: avoiding the penalties for being found in violation of
OSHA regulations. Both the occurrence of accidents and OSHA penalties are
randomvariables, so thefirm(assumed tobe risk-neutral) willconsider the
expected values of both variables when deciding how much to spend on safety.
More formally, let the expected number of accidents, A, be a function of3
the firm's technology (T), workforce (W) and safety expenditures (S):
(1) E (A) —a(T,W,S),witha'.(O and a''>O,
where a' and a'' refer to the derivatives of a with respect to S.Let the
expected penalties. F, be a function of OSRA's enforcement policy (X), as well
as t,e fhia-related variables:
(2) E (F) —p(X,T,W,S) ,with-l<p<O and p''>O
(as with a' and a', p' and p'' focus on the effects of safety expenditures).
If the average cost of each accident to the firm is C (including both direct
costs, such as damage to machinery and compensation to workers, and indirect
Costs, such as higher wages for hazardous employment), the firm will choose its
safety expenditures to minimize its accident- and safety-related costs:
(3)mm (C*a(T,W.S)+p(X,T,W,S)+S).
Examiningthe first order condition for a minimum (thatthis is a minimum,
not a maximum, follows from the assumptions about the derivatives of a and p),
the optimal safety expenditure, S*, will satisfy:
(4)a'(S*) —-(l+p')/C
leading to
(5) */dC > 0and 4*/dIp'I >0
sothat increases in either the expected Costs of an accident or OSHA penalties
will lead togreater expenditures onsafety. In effect, the presence of OSHA
penaltiesreduces the costtothefirm of safetyexpenditures: p'ofevery
dollar spenton safetyis paid for by reducingexpected OSHA penalties. This
assumesthat safety spending reducesboth accidents and OSRA penalties.1 The
assumed risk-neutrality of the firm implies that only the expected value of
OSHApenalties matters, so that a high probability of getting a small penalty
would be equivalent to a low probability of getting a large penalty.4
The behavioral theory of the firm(Cyertand March, 1963) provides an
alternative framework for modelling firmdecisions.The theory includes four
major concepts: quasi-resolution of conflict (addressing multiple goals
sequentially rather than simultaneously); uncertainty avoidance (short-run
reaction to feedback rather than long-run planning); problemistic search
(solving particular problems, rather than general optimization); and
organizational learning (adaptation of goals and attention rules as the
environment changes). These concepts are based on observations of business
decisionmaking processes, in particular observing that firm's behavior deviates
systematicallyfrom optimal performance (which would simultaneously maximize
expected profit over all possible behaviors) because of limitations on the
firm's decisionmaking ability.
Research in behavioral decision theory has found consistent patterns in
which decisionmaking behavior by individuals deviates from optimality as
definedby expected value theory,particularly where probabilistic
relationshipsand expected values are involved (see Schoemaker, 1982). We
suspectthat firm behavior exhibits similar patterns, as suggested by the
behavioral theory of attention allocation in which attention is focused in each
period on that area where the firm's performance fell furthest below
expectations. This sort of firm behavior, called putting out fires' •was
examined in more mathematical detail by Radner (1975). He showed that this is
an affective strategy for 'survival' of the firm (if there are any effective
strategies), and that ittends to keep the firm'sperformance in the different
areas 'close together'.
Ourmodelof the decision process affecting accidents leads us to four
hypotheses implicit in the behavioral model which are not implied by theS
general optimization model. First, an unexpected increase in accidents will
cause managers to pay more attention to safety. This should lead to a
reductionin accidents in later years untilthefirm' a attention turnsbackto
other areas. Similarly, a lower rate of accidents than usual should lead to
less attention and the possibility of risingaccidents inlater years. Since
managerialattention andsafety expenditures are not measureddirectly in the
data, we should find that the unexplained changes in the number of accidents
over time are negatively autocorrelated.
Itis lessclear in the maximizingmodelpresented earlier that S* should
dependon unexpected changes in past accident rates. What matters for S* is
notthe number ofaccidents, A, but theeffectivenessof safetyexpendituresin
reducing expected accidents (a), which ought to be more related to the
technology of the firm than totransitoryshifts in A. Shifts inS*due, for
example,to shifts intechnology wouldbe relatively permanent,andwould lead
topositive, not negative, autocorrelation in the unexplained changes in
accidents. If safety expenditures take the form of changes in the firm's
capital stock, we would also expect to see positive autocorrelation, as one
year's increase in S* reduces A for manyyearsto come.
Second, it could take several years to observe the full effect on
accidents of changes in OSHA enforcement. This is due to the tine needed for
organizational learning: the firm's decision processes are only modified
slowly, as the firm learns of the changes in its operating environment. The
more peripheral the information to primary organizational processes, the longer
the lag between environmental changes and responses by the firm. An increase
in enforcement is expected to raise safety expenditures and reduce accidents as
in the classical model, but with some time delay dependent on the capacity of6
the monitoring system and the firm's ability to act on available information.
The simple classical model presented above does not allow explicitly for such
delays, although it might exhibit some delayed effects if safety expenditures
ware embodied in the firm's capital stock, reducing accidents for several
years.
After a major increase in enforcement a variety of patterns of lagged
effects on accidents could occur, as illustrated in Figure 1. If firms respond
with changes in operations and administration that quickly reduce exposure to
risks, but decay in effectiveness as attention turnselsewhere.Panel A might
result. Capital-intensive expenditures to reduce risk take more timetoplan
and implement,butonce in place provide a more permanent reduction in
accidents, as in Panel B. In some cases, both kinds of effects could combine,
leading to C.
Third,an inspection of a given firmcouldhave alarge effect on that
firm'sexpenditures on safety.If the firm hadbeen focusingonconcerns other
than safety, behavioral theory suggests that the inspection might lead the firm
to focus on safety issues (similarly to the affect of a sudden increase in
accidents, mentioned above). The deterrence analyses developed in the study of
cria.tnology and deviance behavior have long distinguished between general
deterrence- -theeffect of an act of legal punishment on the subsequent
behavior of thegeneralpopulace- -andspecific deterrence- -theeffect of the
punishment on thesubsequentbehavior oftheindividual being punished. These
analyses suggest that the specific deterrence effect implicit in thebehavioral
model could be considerably greater than the classical effect associated with
changes in the level of general enforcement.
Classical theory would suggest that there should benospecific deterrence7
effect(other than the direct abatement of cited violations) unless the firm
concluded.frauthe inspection that it hadbeenwrong in its estimate of
receivinga penalty.2 Firms are assumed tohold rational expectations, in that
theyexpect to rec.ive penalties atthe rate actually experienced, on averag,
bysimilar firms. An alternative basisforfirms'expectationscould be a
Bayesian learning model, with firms updating their prior expectations about
enforcement based on their own experience. Such a model would yield an effect
like specific deterrence, with recently-inspected firms paying more attention
to safety as they revise upward their expectations of enforcement. In terms of
the simple model. S would then be a function of past penalties (specific
enforcement) received by the firm,inaddition to the expected penalties
(general enforcement) faced by the firm.
Fourth, marginal changesin the probability of a penalty andtheaverage
penalty amount may havequite different generaldeterrence effects on accident
rates, depending on which of the two ismostsalient to the firm's monitoring
of the external environment. It maybethat firmshavegood information on the
number of similar firms thatarepenalized,but not on the amount ofpenalties
(orconversely may pay more attention to a few extremely large penalties).
This issue is important in determining the optimal policy mix of wide-ranging
coverageand intensive inspections. In our model,generaldeterrence is
represented independently by the probability and the average amount of
penalties.
The classical deterrence model treats the probability of being inspected
andthe penalty level as perfect substitutes for risk-neutral firms,as noted
earlier. If firms are risk-averse, they willtend Coreact more to the penalty
level than to the probability of being penalized. If firms react more to the8
probabilitythan to the average penalty, risk-loving behavior (or some other
deviation from the simple classical modal) is indicated.
In the empirical work, we measure twoseparateeffects of OSHAenforcement
on safety. The first is the specific deterrence effect (assoctat.iJ with the
behavioral theory), in which an inspection of a particular plant iill have an
effect on safety in that plant. The second is the general deterrence effect
(associated with the classical theory), in which an increase in the (perceived)
expected penalty of non-compliance will have an effect on safety in all plants.
This expected penalty is further divided into the probability of being
penalized and the average value of the penalty,correspondingto the separate
probability andamount usedtocalculateexpected value. These alternative
enforcementmeasures allow us to compare the relative impact of each kind of
enforcement activity on safety.
II. DATA DESCRIPTION
Thedatasetassembled for this project combines information over time on
both accident rates and OSHA enforcement, data which was not available atthe
plant level for previous studies. A dataset producedby thegureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) that contained plant-level accident records from 1979-1985 was
merged with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration' aManagement
Information System (MIS) file containing enforcement actions for all plants
during the same period. The BLS file matched records from the BLS Annual
Survey for all plants with data for each year from 1979 to1985.based ona.
coson identification number availablein the annual files (Ruser and Smith,
1988).All plants in this file that were located in the twenty-eigtt states
with federal OSHA enforcement covered by OSHA's MIS were then matched with the9
OSHAenforcementfile.
Since no commonidentificationnumber was available in both OSHAand BLS
datasets,we employed a sophisticated record-matching programbasedon the
technique of Fallegi andSunter(1969), as described in .ray (1987). Both
datasatscontain various characteristics of the plant,ii.cludiug: firmname,
address, zip code, city, state., employment,and industry. These
characteristicswere used to match plants in. one dataset to plants in the
other, based on the probability of agreement on particular variables.3 To
protect the confidentiality of firms in the BLS Annual Survey, all merging
operations were done at BLS and no firm identifiers were provided on the final
matched data tape. Unfortunately, this precluded us from adding further firm-
specific variables potentially relevant to accident behavior.
The final dataset consists of 6,842 plants with data from 1979 through
1985. For each year, we know employment and hours worked, as well as the
number of lost workday injuries, and the total number of lost workdays. Each
OSHA inspection of the plant during the 1979-85 period is recorded, including
information about the kind of inspection and the citationsand penalties
assessedas a result of the inspection. The final plant-specific identifier is
an industry code, which is limited to the two-digit SIC level to avoid
breachingconfidentiality restrictions.
The plants in thedatasetare not perfectly representative of the
manufacturingsector, as can be seen by the comparisons in Table 1. The BLS
surveysare based on stratified random samples that over-sample large plants,
so plants that were included in seven consecutive surveys are considerably
larger than the typical manufacturing plant. They averaged 523 workers in
1979, compared with 87 workers for all manufacturing plants subject to OSHA10
enforcement.4 The average lost workday incidence rate in 1979 of 6.97 is above
the 5.9 rate for the entire manufacturing sector.
The plants in the sample were also relatively heavily inspected by OSIIA.
About 26% of them were inspected in a given yeat. compared with 2.3% in 1980
for all plants under OSHA's jurisdiction. Furthet.aore, plants in the sample
represented almost 20% of theemployeescovered by OSHA inspections in 1979,
and accountfor an even greater percentage of accidents in the manufacturing
sector.The sample accounted for about 4% of OSHA inspections.tnshort, the
samplerepresents a considerable ifnotnecessarilyrepresentative proportion
ofOSHA's total jurisdiction in manufacturing. We cannot be certain that our
estimatesof OSHAImpacts aregeneralizable to all manufacturingfirms,butwe
believethat this sample may be better than a representative sample for
studying the nature of the impacts of enforcement on accident rates.
III. ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
A.General Deterrence
The estimation procedure for our model requires two stages. The first
equation estimates predicted probability and amount of penalty for each firm in
each year. These general deterrence measures are then incorporated in the
second stage estimation of the determinants of firmaccidentrates. To test
theeffect of general deterrence on accident rates, we need to measure the
expected penalty faced by a non-complying plant. Most previous studies have
used levels of enforcement activities, generally aggregated to the Industry
level,as a proxy for expected penalties. We make use ofour data on actual
penaltiesimposed in plants in our sample toobtain plant-specific predictions
ofexpected probabilities and amounts of penalties. We use anumber of11
variables,including both the traditional enforcement measures aggregated to
thetwo-digitindustryleveland plant-specific accident characteristics, to
calculate the twocomponents ofpredictedexpected penalties for the plant: the
predictedprobability of an inspe'u.ion withpenaltyin a given year (PPROB) and
thepredicted penalty amount if aninsp*ction with penalty occurred (PANT).
Allvariables used in thestudyarelisted in Table 2, and the results for
theequationspredicting PPROB and PANT aregiven in Table 3. Since the
dependentvariable in the PPROB equation is either zeroor one,a probit
estimation procedure was used. The expected penalty received, conditional on
havingbad some penaltyimposed,was estimated using, ordinary least squares on
the subsample of 4 •735plant-yearsin which an iusp.ction with penalty took
place. Alternative estimation methods, including alinearprobability model for
PPROB and a tobit model (attempting to capture both the penalty amount and the
probabilityof being penalized) were also tested, but did not affect the
results materially.
In both equations, the level of OSHA'senforcementactivities in the firm's
two-digitSIC category were represented by the annual numberof inspections
with penalties divided by the number of firms in that industry (INDPROB). and
by the average penalty per inspection with penalty (INDANT). These measures
represent the'enforcementbudget' devoted by OSHA to firms in a given SIC
category, which might be observed during theyearthrough communications
centering around trade associations.
Firm-specific measures included two measuresof size and tworelatedto
accidents.Size is important for OSHAtargeting decisions for increasing the
numberof exposed workers whose working conditions are inspected; accidents are
important because highaccident rates indicate risky environments in which OSHA12
enforcement might be most effective in reducing accidents. Federal OSHAs
records-check policy, for example, attempts to focus inspections on high
accident firms by selecting primarily four-digit SIC industries with injury
rates above the national average, and by terminating inspections if the plants
records indicate that its injury rate lies below the manufacturing average. Je
include one measure of accidents averaged over the two prior years (AVE2NUH),
and one measure of changes in accidents between the second and first year prior
to the current year (PCHNUM..1). Size measures include total hours of work in
the year (LOCHOURS) and average employment during the year (LOCEMPS), both used
in log formtominimize excessive influence of the largest firmsonthe
estimating procedure. Year dummies were added to reflect annualvariationsin
overall OS}tA enforcement activities.
All primary variables except changes in accidents were significant
determinants of theprobabilitythat a firmwouldbe penalized in a given year,
while only the number of penalties per firm was significant in predicting the
amountof penalty. The prior level of accidents was significantly related to
the probability of an inspection, but the change inaccidents wasnot.
Predicted enforcement variables (PPROB andPANT) were generated fromthese
equations, and usedto measurethe expected enforcement faced by the plant in
the second stage ofthe estiisation.
B.Determinants of Accidents
The second stage of the estimation examines the determinants of a plant's
accidents. Two different measures of accidents are used: the number of lost
workday injuries that occurred in the year and thetotalnumber of lost
workdaysin the year. This allowsusto check the independent variables for13
differences between their effect on the frequency (PCHNUK) and the seriousness
of accidents (PCHDAYS). Since PCHDAYS is heavily influenced by a few long-term
injuries (like back injuries) and those factors thatkeepsome individuals out
longer than others, it is more difficult to predict than PCHNUH. Of course,
there may be measurement problems involved in either dependent variable that
would limit our ability to explain it.
For each version of the dependent variable we usethepercentage change
in accidents rather than the level of accidents, for a number of reasons.
First, the change formincorporatesthe bounded rationality notion of feedback,
where the firm would pay more attention to an increase in the number of
accidents than to a high number of accidents. Using changes rather than levels
helps to reduce the problem of unmeasured variables (such as the inherent
safety of a plant's production process) that change only slowly. The change
formalso minimizes the possibility of simultaneitybias caused by OSHA's
policy of targeting inspections on firms with high accident rates, a policy
confirmed by our Initial exploratory analyses 6 Simultaneity biases due to the
impactofcompliance levels (or accidents in our case) on enforcement have been
a major problem in deterrence research (Nagin. 1978); both the autoregressive
errors and the change form of our estimation are designed to minimize this
bias. Our analysis of expected penalties shows that inspections tend to be
targeted more toward firms with a high level of accidents than toward firms
with a growing number of accidents. The percentage change in accidents is used,
ratherthan the change in the numberof accidents, to keep the very large
plants in the sample (which have large numbers of accidents because of their
large workforces) from do.inating the results.
The use of the change form for the dependentvariables also has14
implicationsfor the appropriate ways to measure the independent variables. The
general deterrence model suggests that changes in the expected penalty for non-
compliance will lead to changes in the optimal compliance level for the firm,
and nence lead to changes in the accident rate (so the general enforcement
variables enter the equation in change form). However, the behavioral model
suggeststhat an inspection with penalty focuses the firm' a attention on
improving safety at that plant, so that the specific enforcement variable would
enter directly inzero-one rather than in change form.
The other explanatory variables include employment and hours, as well as
industry and year. Changes in employment or hours worked will change the
opportunities for accidents to happen, and hence change accident rates. In
addition, increasing employment will generally involve hiring new employees.
andincreasing hours perworker may involve increasing worker fatigue, both of
which will increase accidents. This indicates using changes in employment and
hoursrather than levels; here percentage changes are used to avoid giving very
differentvalues to firms of different sizes. If controlling forthe industry
ofthe plant only explainsdifferences in theinherent hazardousness of the
technologyused in theplant, then the industrycontrols will not be
significant.However, different industries could be facing different rates of
progress in developing safer equipment, which could lead to differences in the
change in accidents across industries. Year dummies are also included, to
control for any macroeconomic changes that affect safety across all industries.
The final form of the equation to be estimated is given below.The
residualpart of changes in accidents is allowed to depend on past residuals in
anautoregressiveframework, to test the first hypothesis. The effects of
general as well as specific enforcementvariables on accidents are estimated15
over a number of years to test the second and third hypotheses, and the effect
of the probability and amount components of expected penalties are estimated
separately to test the fourth hypothesis.
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withV —e+al*vt..1 + a2vt..2 + a3*vt.3.
The general deterrence variables, DPPROB and DPAXT, are the change in
expected probability of penalty and the change in expected penalty amount,
respectively. IPEN is a zero-one duiy indicatingwhether aninspection with
penalty occurred atthatplant in that year. PCI4HOURSandPCBEMPmeasurethe
percentage changes in hours worked andnumberof employees, and YEAR and IND
areseries of dummy variables.
Here e(t) is assumed to be an independent, normally distributed series with
a mean of 0. The coefficients aj, a, and a represent the impact on current
accidents of unexplained changes in accident rates from one, two, and three
years ago, respectively. The behavioral theory implies that these coefficients
should be significant and negative. Furthermore, we expect their absolute
values to sum to one or less, in order for the model to be stable. By
explicitly modeling this self-correction process, we minimize the regression to
the mean problem previously recognized in deterrence research. This problem
would arise in our context if many enforcement actions (inspectionswith
penalties)tended to happen during a period of high accident rates, after which
both accident rates and inspections fell. The drop in accident rates back to
its long-run value might be attributed mistakenly to the effectiveness of the16
inspections in the previous period. By modeling the process driving regression
to the mean, we reduce the potential bias in estimates of enforcement effects.
Since our data series for each firm is limited to seven years. we have
limited our estimation of lagged effects to three years of previous data for
the autoregressive process as well as for the enforcement variables.7 Given
the controversies about alternative techniques for estimating finite lag
structures (see Judge et. al., 1980) and the lack of a single, clearly defined
lag structure in our modal, we have allowed each of the lagged variables to
enter the equation directly. This would generally be expected to lead to
multicollinearity and lack of precision on individual lag coefficients, but
this appears not to be a problem, since most estimates were significant and
wererobust to alternative specifications of the equation not reported in this
paper.
IV.DISCUSSION OFRESULTS
Table4 reports the basic estimations of enforcement effects on lost
workday incidents and lost work days. As expected, the independent variables
explain less ofthe variance in lost workdays(6%) than of the variance in lost
workdayincidents (12%). Both equationssupport the same conclusions about the
importanceof the behavioral theoryofthe firm andabout theimpact of
enforcementactions on accidents, although the estimated effects are slightly
differentin the two equations.
A. Hypothesis 1: Self-correcting Mechanisms
Oneof themost striking and robust findings inthis and all other
estimations we ranis the strongtendency of 'surprises' in the accident rate
tobe compensated for and to return to zero within three years. The17
autoregressive coefficients al, a, and a3areconsistently negative and highly
significant. The estimated impact on accidents decreases for more distant
shocks, consistent with the assumption that recent shocks are the most
important in driving firmbehavior.In the estimation based on PCHNUM,any
change in a given year is compensated by a 49% change in the opposite direction
in the following year, a 32% change in the second year. and a 13% change in the
third year. The effect of the residual (unexplained) variation is almost fully
(94%) compensated for over the next three years. This process alone explains
more variance than the other variables combined, raising the explained variance
from 12% for all independent variables to 29% for the autoregressive estimates
for the dependent variable of incidents, and from 6% to 27% for lost workdays.
It should be noted that this autoregressive process is not explained by a
stochastic process in which an unusuallyhighnumber of accidents in one year
is followed by a regression to the mean in the next year. since such a process
would not produce multi-year correlations among residuals. The observed self-
correcting process supports a behavioral theory in which a year with an
unexpectedlyhigh number ofaccidents is counteracted over time by the firm's
effortsto improve safety.
The fact that almost 100% of the initial shock is compensated for is
difficult to explain in terms of classical theory, which would predict some
permanent shift in the level of accidents when those (unobserved) factors
change which affect the optimallevel of safety expenditures. If those
unmeasuredfactors changed slowly over time, wewould observe positive
coefficientsfor Cl, C2anda3, as the changes brought aboutin any period
wouldcontinue to haveeffects in thesame direction in following periods. The
strong negative coefficients indicate that self-correction rather than lagged18
adjustments to optimal levels is more important in accounting for changes in
accident rates.
B. Hypothesis 2: Lagged Effects of General Deterrence
The results in Table 4 demonstrate that both the expected probability and
theamountof penalties exert an overall permanent negative effect on accident
rates.The total effect ofa unit increase in DPPROB, obtained by adding the
coefficients for the currentand lagged values, equals -.75 for the number of
incidents and -.21for lost workdays, with the comparable figures for DPANT
being -1.57 and -.87respectively. The significant positive coefficient in
both equations for the currentvalue of DPPROB is troublesome, but may be due
tothe inclusion of so many general deterrence terms (three each of DPPROB and
DPAMT).8 The insignificance of the second lag of DPPROB and the first lag of
DPAI4T in the lostworkday equation is less troublesome, given the greater
difficulty in predicting lost workdays. On thewhole,these estimates support
thehypothesisthat firms respond to increases in expected penalties by
reducing hazards in the workplace.
Thelength of time required for changes in enforcement toproduce their
fulleffect is longer than had been found previously. While other enforcement
studies have found one year lags between enforcement and effect (Viscusi, 1986a
and Scholz, 1987), our estimates suggest that the effect continues beyond the
first period as well, and that studies using only a single period may not
capture the full effect of enforcement changes. This length of delay is
consistentwith the assumption that implementation of changes to affect
accidents takes considerabletime. The factthat the coefficients do not
becomepositive in longer lags indicates that the initial effect does not decay19
over time, so the effects appear to be permanent (most consistent with Panel B
in Figure 1).
Of course, lagged effects distributed over a number of time periods are
not necessarily evidence of suboptilsality: some economic models .nterp:et
distributed lags as representing optimal behavior within the cor.trat:ts of
fixed investments and contractual obligations (see Gujarati, 1988). Distributed
lagscould also be specified more formally in terms of a Bayesian learning
process in which the lagged effects of changes in the objective environment are
due to the firm's utilization of a 'moving average' estimationof its objective
environmentin safety decisions. Our attempts to force the lagged coefficients
to follow some smooth decay pattern over time (consistent with gradual
learning)were rejected by the data in favorof the separate (and fluctuating)
coefficients reported here.
C.Hypothesis 3: Specific Deterrence
The results in Table 4 confirm the behavioral hypothesis that the surprise
involved in the actual imposition of a penalty has an effect on behavior over
and above thegeneraldeterrence effect of expected probabilities and amounts
ofpenalties. In both equations,the primary effectoccurs in thefirstand
second year after an inspection, confirming the long period of time over which
enforcement effects must be measured. Although the effect remains negative in
the third year after an inspection, thecoefficientis not significant in
either equation. The effect of IPENinthe current year is insignificant for
lost workdays and relatively small for incidents. As with general deterrence,
this pattern is most consistent with case B in Figure 1. These results are
quiterobust to changesin themeasures ofgeneral enforcement used,thelag20
lengthsfor the enforcement variables, or the inclusion of other controls. On
the other hand, the magnitude of the specific deterrence effect is relatively
small when compared to thegeneraldeterrence effect, as seen in the next
section.9
D. Hypothesis 4: Asymmetrical Effects of Probability and Amount of Penalty
Classical deterrence theory assumes that the expected penalty for non-
compliance (represented by the interaction term PPEN—PPROB*PAI4T)should
capture all of the relevant information in PPROB and PANT. However, when we
added PPEN to the regression in Table 4 (not reported here), the coefficients
on PPROBand PANT remain much thesame, and PPENisonly significant in one
laggedterm. The superior performance of the separate variables over the
combined version is consistent with the behavioral theory's suggestion that the
probability and the amount ofpenaltiesare not the perfect substitutes
suggested in classical deterrence theory.
To test the hypothesisthatchanges in the number of inspections with
penalty and the average amount of penalty have different effects on accident-
rates,we have calculated the impact of a 10% change in each onaccidents,as
reported in Table 5.Thesecalculations take account of the effect each
enforcement change has onboththe estimated probability of being penalized
(PPROB) and amount of penalty (PANT), as determined intheestimation equations
for each of these variables reported inTable3.Inaddition, a 10%increase
inthe number of total inspections isassumedto bring about a corresponding
10%increasein the number ofinspectionsdirectly affecting the particular
plants in oursample(IPEN), and therefore affects accidents through IPEN as
well. Thus, for a given change in enforcement policy (dx),theeffect on21
incidents (cIPCHNUH) of the change in the probability of a penalty (working




The firsteffect calculates the impact through PPROB, the second through
PAMT, and thethirdthrough IPEN)° The results reported in Table 5 show that
a 10% increase in inspections with penalty is estimated to decrease lost
workday incidents by 1.61%, whichisabout 75% more than the decrease
associated with the same change in average penalty. The difference in impact
on lost workdays is similar (66%). These results reflect the general
conclusionfrom most empirical research on deterrence (Lempert, 1982 and Nagin,
1978), and Viscusi's 1986 study of OSHA,which findthat the probability of
beingpunished is more likely to have significant effects on compliance than
theamount of penalties.
These results are difficult to explain in terms of the classical deterrence
theory with risk-neutral firms. The combined expected value term associated
withthattheory is less robust thanthe independent terms,andthe independent
termshave assymetrical effects on accidents. To explain these results as a
simple departure from risk-neutrality would requirerisk-loving, not risk-
averse firms.
E.The Impact of Enforcement on Accidents
Contraryto some studies (McCaffrey. 1983; Viscusi, 1979; Bartel and
Thomas, 1985; see Viscusi, 1986b), our estimates suggest that OSHA enforcement
has a significant impact on injury rates, whether measured by lost workday22
incidents or by the number of lost workdays. Furthermore, the magnitude of
effects is somewhat greater than is suggested by those studies finding
significant effects (Mendeloff, 1979; Smith, 1979; Viscusi, 1986a). For
example, Viscusi estimates the total impact of 0511k on injuries to be 1.5-3.6%,
while our results would indicate a 5-16% change in injuries from a 100%
decrease in enforcement (although such an extrapolation is so far beyond the
changes in enforcement on which the estimates are based that it is only given
for comparison, and is not likely to capture what would happen if enforcement
really dropped to zero). We believe that the availability of panel data on
individual firms, and the more appropriate model we were able to use on this
microdata, were better able to capture the relatively small true effects of
enforcement than the previous studies based either on aggregate or cross-
sectionaldata. On the otherhand, we recognize that these estimates are most
relevantfor the relatively large, high-accident plants included in our sample
-- thekind of plants that have remained among the primary concerns of OSHA.
Theimpact on smaller, moretransientfirms in non-manufacturing industries may
indeed be smaller than our estimates would indicate, since 0511k enforcement is
likelyto be more successful in reducing injuries among the firms on which it
focuses most,
Anumerical example may clarify the magnitude of impacts suggested by our
estimates. If we consider a 10% increase in the enforcement effort directed
towards our sample, there would be an increase of 68 in the annual number of
inspectionswith penalties, which would reduce lost workday injuries by 2130
(31 injuries per inspection with penalty), and total lost workdays by 18243
(268 lost workdays per inspection with penalty). Alternatively, this would mean
increasing the average penalty (per inspection with penalty) by $70 (total23
added penalties of $69,765> in order to reduce lost workday injuries by 1230
(18 per dollar of penalty) and total lost workdays by 10365 (1481 per dollar).
The magnitude of these results may depend on the extensive inspection coverage
and large size of the establishments in the sample,'so applying these
projections to the the.entiremanufacturing sector is less sound statistically.
V. CONCUJSION
Wehavefoundevidence inthis study that OSHAenforcementhas a
significant impactonaccidents. Accidents in plants do respond to changes in
enforcementand to specific contacts with enforcement agencies, despite the
factthatcompliance is only indirectly related to accidents (Mendeloff, 1979),
that expendituresoncompliancemaycompetewithmoreproductive expenditures
toimprove safety (Bartel and Thomas, 1985). that OSHA resources do not permit
extensive monitoring of most workplaces (Smith. 1976), and that OSHA penalties
are relatively small compared to compliance costs. The fraction of accidents
explained by enforcement is relatively small,asother studies have found.
Thisis not surprising given the marginal role of regulation compared with the
otherforces affecting accident rates.
Perhaps more importantly, we have demonstrated that the classical
deterrence model that dominates most enforcement analysis is relatively weak
compared with the behavioral model when it comes to analyzing compliance
effects on accident rates. The importance of self-correcting mechanisms, the
relatively long lags between enforcement changes and effects, the difference in
effects between the expected probability andtheexpected amount of a penalty.
andtheindependent effect of inspections on accidents are all more consistent
with the behavioral model than with the simplified forms of deterrence theory24
usually used in enforcement and compliance studies. Although the behavioral
hypotheses we have developed and tested fall considerably short of a well-
developed theory of compliance, they suggest that further research using the
behavioral l,eoryofthe firm can contribute significantly to understanding
compliance behaor and improving enforcement strategies.
A richer model of compliance mayhelpimprove the effectiveness and
efficiency of enforcement strategies. Just as undue reliance on simple
microeconomic models in other policy domains has led to myopic policy advice
(Stern, 1985), reliance on deterrence theory alone limits the enforcement
debate to a relatively narrow spectrum of the practical concerns facing
enforcement officials. For example, our results suggest that, given OSHA's
normallevel of activities and the response of our sample firms, increasingthe
numberof penalties has about a 50% greater effect in reducing accidents than a
comparable percentage increase in the average amount of penalties. The two do
notappear to beperfect substitutes, as would be suggested by simple
deterrencetheory. If these results prove to be correct, OSHA could increase
its impact at the margin by shifting resources to doing more inspections, even
if that meant having lower penalties for noncompliers.
The efficiency of safety standards in reducing accidents, while important,
maybe less important than the need to focus the firm's attention onsafety
problems. e cannotsay whether the decreases in accidents found in this study
areefficient (from society's point of view), but to the extent that the firm's
safety expenditures were suboptimal because of inattention, the decreases in
accidents may derive more from focusing the firm's efforts on an effective
risk-reduction program than from safety improvements directly related to
compliance with regulations. If the behavioral model proves to be as powerful25
as these preliminary results suggest, then the conventional wisdom on the role
of regulation and enforcement in the economy will need to be reevaluated to
include this attention-correction function (Scholz, 1984b).26
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FOOTNOTES
1.Most analysts note, however, that mandatedexpendituresmaynotbe themost
efficient way for the firm to reduce accidents, and some contend thatrl'e
mandatedexpenditures substitute for other investments that could potentially
contribute more to decreasing risk (Bartel and Thomas, 1985).
2. Viscusi (l986b) argues that higher penalties for repeated violations may
provide an alternative reason for firmstomake investments in compliance (and
safety) after an inspection that they would not have been willing to make
before being inspected.
3. Those cases where it was not clear whether the records were properly
matchedwere hand-checked. Hand-checking used to examine the matches on two
state samples indicated that our error rates for false matchesand missed
matcheswere below one percent. To ensure that all plants in the final set
containedno ambiguousmatches, 198 plantsweredropped from the original file.
4.Firms with 10 or fewer employees are not targeted for inspections, and are
excluded fromthis comparison.
5.Thesepredicted values are not instrumental variables in the usual sense.
since we include the actualenforcementexperience of the plant inourmeasures
ofspecific deterrence. They are intended to measure the firm's expectation of
the OSHA enforcement it will face (general enforcement).
6. Using regressions to explain the level (or logarithm) of accidents rather
than the percentage change in accidents, frequently inspected plants were
always found to have more accidents than less-inspected plants. We interpret
this as caused by an omitted variable bias, where the omittedvariable is the
inherenthazardousness of the plant (associated with both more accidents and
more inspections).
7. The results are not sensitive to varying from one to four years the lag
lengths on either the autoregressive process or the enforcement variables.
8. Whenthe sameregressions are run omitting the DPENvariables,the
coefficient on current DPROB goes to zero.30
9. Both theories suggest that inspections without penalties are unlikelyto
have a strong effect on accidents. In earlier analyses wetested a variable
measuring all inspections rather than only inspectionswith penalty, and found
it to be much less strongly associated with the accidentvariables.
10. The first twoeffectshave three components each: policj affects aggregate
enforcement, which affects predicted (general) enforcement, whichaffects
accidents. The third effect has twocomponents:policy affects specific
enforcement, which affects accidents.
Letuslook in detail at the calculation of the first effect. Since the
mean value of INDPROBisabout .04, a 10% increase in enforcement would raise
INDPROBby about.004 (dINTPR0B/dX). This affects PPROB by the coefficient on
INDPROBinTable 3, which is .79. Finally,thischangeaffects PCHNUMoverthe
next few years, given by summing the coefficients on DPPROB in Table4 (both
current and lagged values), yielding 1.2 -1.4-0.6—-.8.In total, the
first effect is given by the product of these three terms, .004*.79*(. .8) —
.0025,or .25% (the value of .22% in the table is based on using more precise
values for the calculations).
The other effects in the table are based on the coefficients from Table 3
and Table 4, and a calculation of the effect of a 10% increase in enforcement
on INDAMT(sinceINDANTisbased on log(penalties). we get dINDA14T/dX —.10)
andonIPEN (the mean value is about .1, so dIPEN/dX'.Ol).31
FICURE 1
Alternative Patterns of Delay for the
Effects of Enforceiient on Accidents







lassediate effect Delayed permanent Delayed effect
with decay affect with decay
Note: Stars represent the number of accidents (measured vertically) over time
(measured horizontally). The vertical line "1" indicates when the enforcement
action occurred.32
TABLE1
COMPARISONOF SAMPLE WITh NATIONAL MANUFACTURING SECTOR
National
Sample Sample Manufacturing Sector
1979 (1979-85 average) 1979
Number ofestablishments6842 6842 209,851 a
Averagenumber employees 523 479 87 a
Total number employees 3,575,394 3,277,318 18.291,000 a
Average lost workday
injury race 6.97 6.02 b
Average number lost
workday injuries 25 19 5 C
Totalnumber lost
workday injuries 171,333 132,305 1,243,000 b
Average number
lost workdays 363 303 79 C
Totalnumber
lost workdays 2,484,704 2,073,126 18,998.000 b
Probabilityof
inspection .27 .26 .023 d
Probabilityof
inspection W/penalty .13 .10
Average penalty per
inspection $498 $269 $275 de
Total penalties $1,721,063 $697,654 $14,400,000 d
Sources:
a. National CensusofManufacturers, 1977. Includes only firmswithmore than
10 employees, since smaller firmshavebeen excluded from targeted
inspections since 1981.
b. Occupational Injuries and Illnesses in 1979: Suary(BLS, April,1981)
c.Based on adjustments to estimatenumber of firmswithover 10 employees in
1979, based on change in employment 1977-1979.
d. Centaur Associates (1985). Figures are for 1980. for all industries.
e. Calculation based on all inspections and on initial penalty imposed.
Average penalty per inspection with penalty was $1,063 in 1978 (ad4usted to
1983 prices), but dropped to $380 in 1983. Adjustments to penalties
averaged 33%throughout the period.33
TABLE2
VARIABLES USEDIN ANALYSIS
VARIABLEMEAN (STD. DEV) DESCRIPTION
I. Accidents
LWNUM 19.3(40.4)Nuaber of LostWorkdayInjuries
PCHNUM-.051 (.80) Proportional change in LWNUM:
(LWNUM(t) -LWNUM(c-1))/((LWNUM(t)+LWNUM(t-1))/21
AVG2NU1419.4(37.8)Average LWNUM inpasttwo years:
(LWNUM(t-l) +LWNUM(t-2))/2
LIJDAYS 303 (731) Nuisberof LostWorkdays
PCHDAYS-.036 (1.0) Proportional change in LVDAYS(like PCHNUM)
II.Probability of Penalty
IPEN .099 (.29) Inspection with penaltyduringyear (duimny var)
PPROB .106 (.06) Predicted probability of inspection
(based on Table 3 coefficients)
DPPROB -.010 (.02) ChangeinPPROB —(PPROB(t)-PPROB(t-l))
INDPROB .038 (.03) Industryprobabilityof inspection u,'penalty
(based en 2-digit SIC industry, national totals)
III. AmountofPenalty
ANT .600 (1.8) Total log(penalties) assessed during year (note that
eaztANT isbased on all inspections, but PANTand
INDANTare based only on inspections with penalty)
PANT 5.962(.31)Predicted log(penalties) assessed if inspection w/
penaltyoccurred (based on Table 3 coefficients)
DPAMI-.086 (.17) Change in PANT—(PANT(t) PAZtT(t-l))
INDANT4.833 (.69) Industry average log(penalty) assessed if inspection
W/penaltyoccurred (2-digit SIC national data)
flY. Size of Fira
HOURS 926 (1912)Hours worked during year (in thousands)
LOCHOURS13.0(1.1) Log (HOURS)
PCHHOURS -.019(.25)Percentage change in HOURS (like PCHNUM)
EMPS 479 (982)Average eaploylient during year
LOCEMPS5.48(1.1) Log (EMPS)
PCUEMPS -.019(.22)Percentage change in EMPS (like PCHNUM)
Meansand standard deviations calculated for full sample of 48,794
plant-year observations.34
TABLE 3
EQUATIONSPREDICTING PROBABILITY AND AMOUNT OF EXPECTED
PENAL!?. BASED ON ESTIMATION OF IPEN AND ANT
(Probit for IPEN. OLS on non-zero ANT)
(t-statisticin parentheses)
To predict: Probai1ity Amount
(PPROB) (PANT)



























Nun. obs. 47,894 4.735




ESTIMATED IMPACT OF ENFORCEMENT ON FIRM ACCIDENTS
(IncludingAutoregressive Error Structure)





DPPROB (t) 1.208 1.023
(4.6> (3.0)
DPPROB (t-l) -1.357 -.840
(-5.6) (-2.6)


































Num. Obs 27,368 27,368
Mean (dep var) -.046 -.026
Total R.2 .289 .274
R2 (w/o autoreg) .123 .063
NOTE: Industrydummy variables(2-digit SIC) were also included.36
TABLE 5
IMPACT OF POLICY CHANCES ON ACCIDENT MEASURES
(Effectof a 10% change in enforcement variables on
Lost Workday Incidents and on LostWorkdays)
LOST WORKDAY INCIDENTS
Affecting Incidents through:
10% Change in Expected Expected Actual
Enforcement: Probability AmountInspection TOTAL EFFECT
(PANT) (IPEN)
Inspectionsv. Penalty-.22% -1.26% -.13% -1.61%
(INDPROB)
Average Penalty -.06% -.87% -.93%
(INDANT)
LOST WORKDAYS
Affecting Lost Workdays through:
10% Change in Expected Expected Actual
Enforcement: ProbabilityAmountInspection TOTAL EFFECT
(PANT) (IPEN)
Inspections w. Penalty -.07% -.70% -.11% -.88%
(INDPROB)
Average Penalty -.02% -.48% -.50%
(INDAMT)